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Journey in Thought – Hannah Arendt
By Jonathan Rée
Editorial note: The text published below is the transcript of a BBC radio feature in the series 
“Journeys in Thought” created by Jonathan Rée. Rée concentrates on turning points in the 
intellectual lives of great thinkers, exploring their ideas and positioning them in time and place. His 
journey to Israel “in the footsteps of the philosopher and political theorist Hannah Arendt” took 
him to Jerusalem, from where he returned with a unique and lively documentary radio programme, 
thus adding a valuable contribution to the debate on Arendt and her book Eichmann in Jerusalem. 
The programme was first broadcast on 23 November 2003, with a repeat on 28 August 2004; it can 
be listened to at http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio3/journeysinthought/pip/ashxz/. Having taught 
philosophy in London for nearly thirty years, Jonathan Rée became a househusband and freelance 
writer at the turn of the millenium. His books include Proletarian Philosophers, Philosophical 
Tales, Heidegger, and I See a Voice. For the last ten years he has been working on a history of 
philosophy. We are grateful to Jonathan Rée for permission to reproduce his programme.
This is King George V Street in West Jerusalem. It was here on the 9th of April 1961 that 
the New York writer Hannah Arendt checked into the Hotel Maria ready to tackle what 
would be the biggest journalistic assignment of her life. She was one of the greatest 
political thinkers of her time, and she had come to Jerusalem as a reporter for the New 
Yorker magazine to cover the trial of the former Gestapo officer Adolf Eichmann. 
Eichmann had been a Nazi functionary with a special interest in the Jewish question, and 
it was alleged that he, more than anyone else, was the logistical organizer of the murder of  
six million Jews in the Holocaust. 
Arendt herself was a Jew of German origin, but she was now a citizen of the United 
States. Her overall coverage of the trial, published as Eichmann in Jerusalem, was to 
embroil her in damaging controversy, and there was one particular phrase – ‘the banality  
of evil’ – which many of her critics found totally unforgivable.
Richard Sennett:
"Hannah Arendt was not a cowardly person and she reveled in provocation."
Avishai Margalit:
"Everything she says about critical thought as the basis for moral action is crucial to our 
days."
Susan Neiman:
"I think it is one of the most important works of philosophy of the twentieth century." 
*
The Israeli secret service had kidnapped Eichmann in Argentina the year before and  
brought him to Jerusalem to face the accusation of crimes against humanity and against 
the Jewish people. But the trial was not just about what Eichmann was alleged to have 
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done – it was about Jewishness and genocide, about politics, history and collective 
memory.
Shlomo Avineri is a professor of philosophy in Jerusalem, and he sees the trial as an 
essential supplement to the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal of 1945. 
Shlomo Avineri: 
"I think Eichmann got a better hearing in Jerusalem than Göring and Ribbentrop and 
others got at Nuremberg after the war. However, it was a trial which was used to settle a 
historical account and to establish in the mind of Israelis – in the mind of the world – the 
enormity of the Holocaust. And therefore it had meaning beyond the individual fate of 
Eichmann." 
I have now walked up to the hill, past the old classical Parliament building, and have 
come to the House of Justice where Eichmann's trial took place – except that it is not in 
fact a courtroom at all, but an 800-seat theatrical auditorium. At the moment, an 
exuberant group of students from a local high school are on the stage rehearsing their 
own dance project called "The World Belongs to Young Lovers". It takes some effort to 
recall the period from April to August 1961: this was the place where the 58-year-old 
Adolf Eichmann, balding and bespectacled, sat in a bullet-proof glass cage flanked by 
armed guards. On the tier above him was a team of translators, and above them were the 
stenographers and the three judges: Moshe Landau, Yitzhak Raveh and Benjamin Halevy.  
Down on the stage – face to face with Eichmann – was the prosecution team, led by a man 
who was to dominate the entire trial with his extravagant oratory and his sense of 
dramatic timing: the Israeli Attorney General, Gideon Hausner.
Gideon Hausner: 
"Here with me, at this moment, stand six million prosecutors. But alas, they cannot rise 
to level the finger of accusation in the direction of the glass dock and cry out: ‘J'accuse!’ 
against the man who sits there." 
Leora Bilsky:
"Gideon Hausner had a great sense of drama. And he was not a criminal lawyer before  
then actually. He was just appointed for the job two months before, and it became the 
case of his life."
Leora Bilsky, who teaches Law at Tel Aviv University.
The Israeli police had already spent the best part of the year interrogating Eichmann 
and preparing materials for the prosecution, including a selection of what was called 
‘suffering with the Jewish people witnesses’. But Hausner wasn't satisfied. With the 
backing of the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, he wanted the tribunal to be 
much more than a trial of one individual Nazi. It was to be a judicial reckoning with the 
entire fate of the Jews in the Holocaust.
Leora Bilsky: 
"He was given the names of fifty potential witnesses – survivors – to choose from them. 
And he said: 'No, no, no! I want a hundred of them. I want to tell the story of the 
Holocaust chronologically and step by step.' And actually, it was very important because 
even though every survivor thought they knew what the Holocaust was about, everybody 
had a very small part of this." 
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Hausner was addressing himself not only to the three judges but also to the dozens of 
international journalists, including Hannah Arendt; and the hundreds of Israeli citizens 
who together formed the audience in the House of Justice.
Avishai Margalit:
"If I have to mention a formative experience in my life, I would definitely mention the 
Eichmann trial."
Avishai Margalit, professor of philosophy at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, who 
was a young soldier at the time of the trial.
Avishai Margalit:
"I became quite hooked on it to the point at which I was afraid that I will get an addict. I  
always was afraid of being mesmerized with the Holocaust pornography. I was attracted 
[to] and repelled by the whole story. But when the Eichmann trial came to the fore, I was 
swept by it and got very, very interested. It made a tremendous impression on my 
generation and on me personally. It is hard to overstate the impression that it made,  
because the Holocaust was not really discussed; there was deep silence and 
embarrassment. And the Eichmann trial suddenly brought it all out in a dramatic way." 
Was the proceeding broadcast at the time?
Avishai Margalit:
"Almost all the time. There was a non-stop [broadcast] and there was only one channel.  
So the whole country was glued to it." 
One of the people listening to those live broadcasts was the historian Idith Zertal, who 
was then a teenager, happily immersed in the collective life of her kibbutz some seventy 
kilometres out of Tel Aviv.
Idith Zertal:
"I was seventeen. I remember one episode that struck me really – about a Nazi officer 
killing a youngster who had stolen an apple. This I remember from the testimonies. I 
remember it very sharply. I remember myself listening to the radio entire days and 
weeping – crying! – and not being able to leave the radio. For me, it was a shock! A 
discovery. For the first time, I discovered the Holocaust through the witnesses' 
testimonies."
The revelations were in fact a double shock for Idith Zertal. But it had dawned on her 
that the Holocaust had affected lots of people she knew, including her own family. She 
had never heard it discussed. 
Idith Zertal:
"This is almost paradoxical because my father fought in the war against the Nazis – he 
was a soldier in the British Army – and then he worked with Jewish survivors in Europe 
after the war; and yet he never talked about it. We never talked about it, they never talked 
about it, and it was very metaphorical for the silence – the organized silence in Israel in  
the collectivist, socialist Israel at the time. The Holocaust was not there."
*
Hannah Arendt was born in Germany in 1906 – the same year as Eichmann himself. As  
a young woman, she had been a passionate student of philosophy and she had the great  
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Martin Heidegger not only as her teacher, but also for a while as her lover. But she was a 
Jew as well as a philosopher, and in 1933 after the Nazis came to power, she gave up all  
thoughts of an academic career and fled to Paris.
She was 26 years old and astonishingly good-looking with her cropped hair, boyish 
features and a cigarette constantly in her mouth. Before long, she found a job in Paris as a 
kind of social worker, preparing Jewish children for a new life in Palestine. In fact, she 
once escorted a group and made her first visit to Jerusalem in the mid-1930s. In 1941 she 
got to New York eventually making good money as an editor and writer. Her book on The 
Origins of Totalitarianism was one of the first systematic attempts to understand Nazi 
anti-Semitism. What is frightening in the rise of totalitarianism, she wrote, is not that it is 
something new, but that it has brought to life the ruin of our categories of thought and 
standards of judgment.
When Arendt got the chance to cover the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, she felt she had 
no choice. It would undoubtedly be a very painful experience, but it was – she said – ‘an 
obligation I owe to my past.’
Stephen Aschheim:
"Quite clearly she wanted to go because there was the overall recognition that the 
Eichmann trial encapsulated almost every aspect that was of interest to somebody who 
was Jewish, who was German, who had gone through German culture, who was identified 
in one way or another with the state of Israel, and who had to address the problem of 
genocide in our age; and it combined almost all of these questions in a way that – I think 
– has never ever occurred again." 
Stephen Aschheim from the University of Wisconsin.
Arendt's account of the trial, Eichmann in Jerusalem, was published in five weekly 
instalments in The New Yorker in the spring of 1963 – thousands of column-inches of 
grim analysis and reportage threatening their way through hundreds of pages of 
advertisements for fashionable clothes, Scotch whisky and relaxing holiday cruises. 
Quote Hannah Arendt, from The New Yorker, 16th February 1963: Our Reporter at 
Large, Eichmann in Jerusalem, Part One:
“Every morning, the words ‘Bet Hamishpath’ (The House of Justice), shouted by the 
court usher at the top of his voice, make us jump to our feet as they announce the arrival 
of the three judges, who, bare-headed and in black robes, walk into the courtroom from a 
side entrance to take their seats on the highest tier of the raised platform at the front of 
the long hall.”
Hannah Arendt explains that Eichmann and all the rest of the non-Hebrew speakers  
including herself had to listen to simultaneous translations through headphones and that 
these translations were... 
QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
"... excellent in French, bearable in English, and sheer comedy, frequently 
incomprehensible, in German." 
Arendt quickly made it clear that while she admired Moshe Landau, the presiding  
judge, she loathed Gideon Hausner, the prosecutor. She regarded Hausner as a showman 
who treated the trial as if it were a mass meeting at which speaker after speaker does his  
best to arouse the audience. As far as she was concerned, the aim of the trial should have 
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been simply to establish what had actually been done by Eichmann rather than refer to 
every wrong that had been suffered by the Jews.
Some critics such as Leora Bilsky believe that there was an element of snobbishness in  
Arendt's attitude to Hausner. He was after all an 'Easterner' – a 'Yiddish speaker' – who 
came not from Western Europe but from Galicia, in what is now the Ukraine. 
Leora Bilsky:
"I think that here came her touchdown. She was a German from a family that was very 
educated, middle-class, and Hausner represented to her the 'Ostjuden' – the Jews from 
the East – who talked with great pathos and sentimentality, liked dramas, and she could 
not stand it; she wanted calmness and objectivity – very calm talk. It was a personal  
disliking there." 
Arendt's sarcasm about Attorney General Hausner was bound to annoy the government 
of the Israeli state and all its friends. But what upset them even more was her discussion 
of the Judenräte – the Jewish Councils – the Jewish elite which had been entrusted with 
some responsibility for Jewish life under the Nazis, and which – at least according to 
Eichmann's testimony – had been more than willing to collaborate with the Nazi 
authorities.
QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
"The moral problem lay in the amount of truth there was in Eichmann's description of 
the Jewish collaboration even under the conditions of the Final Solution. To a Jew, this 
role of the Jewish leaders in the destruction of their own people is undoubtedly the 
darkest chapter of the whole dark story." 
*
Copies of all the records of the Eichmann trial are held at Yad Vashem, Israel's centre 
for memorializing the Holocaust. Yaacov Lozowick is director of archives there. 
Yaacov Lozowick:
“We are in one of the strong-rooms of the archive. It has in it a few miles of shelves – 
archivists love to measure the size of their collections by how many miles of shelves they 
have…”
… But this is a copy of the documentation that was prepared for the prosecution case in 
the trial.
Yaacov Lozowick:
“Yes.... We have all 1 600 or 1 700 files that the Israeli police collected for the 
prosecution prior to the trial – we have that; we have about 170 hours of video tape from 
what was taken in the courtroom itself; we have the transcripts of the trial, of course." 
After we emerge from the archive, I ask Yaacov Lozowick what Arendt said about the 
Jewish Councils that was so contemptuous.
Yaacov Lozowick:
"That the Nazis would not have been able to murder millions of Jews had the Jewish 
leaderships in the various geographical areas or ghettos not participated – willingly or  
unwillingly – in this process. And this willingness of the Jewish leadership to cooperate 
with Nazi overlords made the Nazis' job much easier and ultimately more successful,  
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thereby putting a part of blame for the Holocaust on the Jewish leadership. Now, there 
are Jews – many survivors – who were willing to put specific blame on specific Jewish 
figures for specific events during the Holocaust. But turning it into a general statement 
that Nazis could not have murdered the Jews had the Jews not participated, had the Jews 
not cooperated, seemed to everybody absolutely bonkers. There was the divorce between 
Hannah Arendt and certainly the Jewish side. After she had written that, she was beyond 
appeal for them." 
The other way in which Hannah Arendt won enemies was by quoting from Eichmann's 
testimony in order to explore the vast gap she saw between the unspeakable horror of the 
deeds and the undeniable ludicrousness of the man who had perpetrated them. For 
Arendt, Eichmann was not so much an infernal monster, but a mindless fool with what 
she called a ‘horrible gift’ for consoling himself with clichés. She found something strange 
and even comic in Eichmann, especially in his ‘heroic fight’ with the German language 
which invariably defeats him.
QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
"He was genuinely incapable of uttering a single sentence that was not a cliché. The 
longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was 
closely connected to his inability to think – namely to think from the standpoint of 
somebody else." 
It struck her that the only topic Eichmann could talk about with conviction was himself. 
QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
"He was perfectly sure that he was not what he called an 'innere Schweinehund' – a 
dirty bastard – in the depths of his heart; and as to his conscience, he remembered  
perfectly well that he would have had a bad conscience if he had not done what he had 
been ordered to. Despite all the effort of the prosecution, everybody could see that this 
man was not a monster, but it was difficult indeed not to suspect that he was a clown." 
Eichmann a clown? Avishai Margalit of the Hebrew University is not persuaded, 
pointing out that Eichmann was also an ambitious ideologue who had done his best to 
become an expert on Jewish affairs. 
Avishai Margalit:
"She describes him as a mindless, thoughtless bureaucrat. I think, she got him wrong. 
First, he prepared himself before the war. He became in charge of Jewish things before 
the war. Studied Heb[rew], came to Palestine to learn the place. He knows the stuff; he is 
an expert [sic!]." 
Stephen Aschheim also takes this view of Hannah Arendt's interpretation of 
Eichmann's banality:.
Stephen Aschheim:
"The portrait of Eichmann not as an ideologically determined fanatic Anti-Semite, not  
indeed as a monster, but as a banal bureaucrat who in very determined fashion, once  
given a task to do, does it quite independently of his feelings or his notions; simply goes 
on with it as a bureaucratic deed, that is to say as a 'banality of evil' as she calls it. It was 
ordinary bureaucrats doing their job thoughtlessly once given the task. She was proposing 
here the idea – perhaps even more frightening than anti-Semitism – that genocide can be  
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done by people who don't necessarily harbour a hatred of their victims. That may be the 
nature of modern bureauratic genocide. In the case of Eichmann she was wrong." 
I must say I find a big difference between what Arendt actually wrote in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem and what I hear about it from her critics. She may have found Eichmann 
absurd or even comic, but she had no doubt that what he had done was evil and that he 
deserved absolutely no mercy from the court. Here is the historian Idith Zertal again.
Idith Zertal:
"She was perceived as uncompassionate towards the Jews – but she was not – on the 
contrary! But she never, never – it is almost shameful that I should say – she never, never 
took Eichmann's side. She loathed Eichmann – his thoughtlessness, his ludicrousness, his  
emptiness, his nothingness. His being a docile executor of orders, of ideology was for her  
the sum up of everything she loathed in everybody everywhere. She couldn't take 
Eichmann's side, she couldn't sympathize with Eichmann. It was a total 
misunderstanding of what she wrote." 
Hannah Arendt certainly thought that the trial had drawn a veil over the collaboration 
between Jewish leadership in Europe and the Nazi authorities. But she never for a 
moment suggested that Jews should be held responsible for their own destruction. The 
truth – it seems to me – is almost exactly the opposite: what she objected to was the 
attempt by the prosecution to present the Jews of the European Diaspora as solely feeble 
after centuries of anti-Semitism; that they had gone to their death like sheep. She 
criticized the trial for covering up the valiant work of Europe's Jewish resistance fighters 
and she was outraged by what she regarded as the cruel and silly leading question that  
Hausner put to all his witnesses: 'Why did you not protest?'
QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
"Mister Hausner wanted to demonstrate that whatever resistance there had been, had 
come from Zionists. As though of all the Jews only Zionists knew that if you could not 
save your life, it [would] be desirable to save your honor. There exist many things 
considerably worse than death, and the SS saw to it that none of them was ever very far 
from the mind and the imagination of their victims. In this respect, the deliberate attempt 
in Jerusalem to tell only the Jewish side of the story distorted the truth. Even the Jewish 
truth." 
*
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt was not only writing as a journalist and 
political commentator, but as a philosopher as well. One of her philosophical 
preoccupations had always been the nature of politics, or rather what she called 'political  
space.'
When she spoke of politics, she meant the kind of secular public realm in which 
individuals could leave their private lives behind them and interact simply as equal 
citizens. To Arendt, this political space was one of the most precious of historical 
achievements but also one of the most fragile. Engagement with politics was an essential 
dimension of any worthwhile life. But when the public world of politics got tangled up 
with the personal world of passion and love, the result was bound to be a disaster to both.
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QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
"Whatever the passions and the emotions may be, they certainly are located in the 
human heart; and not only is the human heart a place of darkness which no human eye 
can penetrate – the qualities of the heart need the darkness and protection against the 
light of the public to grow and to remain what they are meant to be. However deeply 
heartfelt a motive may be, once it is brought out and exposed to public inspection, it 
becomes an object of suspicion." 
Those remarks come from a book called On Revolution, which Arendt wrote and 
published in parallel with Eichmann in Jerusalem. Arendt's argument was that modern 
politics was endangered by a deepening obsession with private emotions. This obsession,  
she said, was typical of the totalitarian police states of the twentieth century – regimes 
which sought to control the thoughts of their citizens as well as their actions, and she 
traced it back to the reign of terror and suspicion in the French Revolution. The cool, dry 
intelligence of classical politics, she believed, was in danger of being drowned in floods of  
nostalgia and sentimentality. 
She had some sympathy with the thoughts of Karl Marx, but she was horrified by his 
dismissive attitude to politics – his idea that it was merely a mechanism by which one  
class imposes its will on the other. 
I asked Richard Sennett at the London School of Economics what he makes of Arendt's 
claims for the political public sphere and its distinctness from economic and social life.
Richard Sennett:
"This was her fundamental break with Marxism. People don't understand it, but there is 
nothing strange about it. I think – although I don't agree with it – I think it is a quite 
admirable attempt. What she wanted to do was to lift the human being as a 'political 
animal' out of the circumstances of scarcity, inequality, relative lack, differentiation in an 
arbitrary fashion. To accomplish that end, one has to celebrate the anonymity of political  
activists. Their identities, where they come from and so on are irrelevant to empowering 
them politically."
One consequence of Arendt's belief in the anonymity or impersonality of political action 
was that she was not prepared to let her Jewishness (which she regarded as a purely 
personal matter) become a factor in her political judgments – even when it came to Israel 
and the Eichmann trial. This stubborn refusal was to lead to some painful quarrels – not 
least with the celebrated Jewish scholar Gershom Scholem, whom she had first met in 
Berlin in the early thirties. When the New Yorker articles on “Eichmann in Jerusalem” 
were gathered together and published as a book, Scholem issued a fierce open letter 
denouncing his old friend. Scholem said he always used to regard her as 'a daughter of our  
people', but now he felt he had been deceived. Arendt had revealed herself, he said, as  
totally incapable of love for the Jewish people. In her reply, Arendt did not deny the fact, 
but she was appalled by the imputation.
QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
"You are quite right: I am not moved by any love of this sort. And for two reasons, I 
have never in my life loved any people or collective – neither the German people nor the 
French nor the American nor the working class or anything of that. I indeed only love my 
friends, and the only kind of love I know of or believe in, is the love of persons." 
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It seems that Arendt's revulsion from the idea of love of the Jewish people goes back to 
an evening in Jerusalem at the time of the Eichmann trial. Arendt had made friends with 
the Israeli historian Leni Yahil, and was glad of the chance to spend time with her and her  
family. But the friendship was not to survive the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem.
Leni Yahil:
"I liked her very much. On the other side, when I read the book or when I read the 
articles, I was devastated, I could not understand." 
Professor Yahil is now in her nineties, small but energetic and as passionate as ever.  
When I was around with a cup of very strong coffee in her little flat in Jerusalem, she 
recalled having Arendt over for dinner in her house one evening. Her husband, Chaim 
Yahil, a prominent diplomat and senior official at the Israeli Foreign Office, invited Golda 
Meir, Israel's foreign minister of the time, to come and join them afterwards.
Leni Yahil:
"My husband asked Golda Meir, who was his boss, if she is interested to meet Hannah 
Arendt, suggested she came that evening. When she entered the room all the people got 
up, and Hannah Arendt had eyes like that. She hadn't dreamed about it – that she could 
have a talk with somebody of the government. Then, later, a discussion developed [about] 
the relation of Golda Meir to the Jewish people." 
Arendt recalled the discussion with Golda Meir, Israel's future prime minister, in her 
reply to Scholem's wounding open letter:
QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
"What she said – I'm not sure of the exact words any more – it ran to me like this: 'You 
will understand that I, as a socialist, of course do not believe in God. I believe in the 
Jewish people.' I found this a shocking statement and being too shocked, I did not reply at  
the time, but I could have answered: 'The greatness of this people was once that it 
believed in God, and now this people believes only in itself?! What good can come of 
that?' Well, in this sense, I do not love the Jews nor do I believe in them. I merely belong 
to them as a matter of course beyond dispute or argument."
In her letter to Scholem, Arendt went on to deplore the disastrous results of allowing 
emotions to be displayed in public and become a factor in political affairs. Throughout her 
life, she would find herself accused of lacking compassion for the victims of oppression; 
but as far as she was concerned, what was at stake was not her private capacity for 
sympathy but the overriding importance of keeping the political public sphere free of 
emotions and sentimentality.
QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
"Generally speaking, the role of the heart in politics seems to me altogether 
questionable." 
*
Sometimes Hannah Arendt had to work hard to tease out the philosophical issues from 
the masses of historical material brought up by the Eichmann trial. But on one 
remarkable day, the proceedings themselves turned explicitly to the moral philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant and Eichmann's interpretation of the categorical imperative – that is to 
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say of Kant's version of the idea that to act morally is to act in a way that we would want 
everyone else to act as well.
QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
"To the surprise of everybody, Eichmann came up with an approximately correct  
definition of the categorical imperative: I meant by my remark about Kant that the 
principle of my will must always be such that it can become the principle of universal 
laws." 
Arendt was right: Eichmann's version of Kant's moral philosophy or what he called in a 
characteristic phrase ‘Kantianism adapted for the household use of the little man’ was far 
from stupid. But the categorical imperative also implies that morality involves autonomy 
or self-mastering; and here, Eichmann's explanation of Kant became decisively eccentric.
QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
"He then proceeded to explain that from the moment he was given responsibility for 
carrying out the Final Solution, he had consoled himself with the thought that he was no 
longer master of his own deeds." 
Eichmann seems to have thought that because he was simply following orders, he was 
no longer responsible for his deeds. And once again, he was not entirely mistaken: Kant's  
philosophy really does imply that morality requires autonomy or ‘mastery of one's own 
deeds,’ as Eichmann called it – as opposed to heteronomy or dependence. Without self-
determination, there could not be such thing as moral responsibility. But Eichmann had 
given Kant's doctrine a quite unexpected twist, thinking it would somehow exonerate him. 
As it happened, Avishai Margalit was also sitting in the House of Justice that day.
Avishai Margalit:
"This was the day I was in trial, the following exchange took place – the thing between 
Judge Raveh and Eichmann: Judge Raveh said to Eichmann: 'I read in the accounts by  
the police investigator, and you say you behaved according to the categorical imperative  
of Immanuel Kant.' So he asked him: 'What do you mean by that?' And Eichmann said: 
'Look, Kant makes the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy. You should 
behave as a moral agent where you are free to act as such. But I wasn't free! So when I was 
free, I behaved accordingly, and when I wasn't free, I'm not accountable.'
I knew that people repudiated, but I found it at the time as a youngster... I was very 
troubled by this exchange, I must admit. There was nothing banal about it! I thought: He 
is making a point. And I don't think too many banal people who are thoughtless would 
have come up with this account." 
As far as Arendt was concerned, the link between Kant and the Eichmann trial went far  
deeper: for Kant, who also wrestled with the so-called problem of evil, the question was 
how evil entered the world and how we can face up to evil without giving up our hope.
For Susan Neiman, director of the Einstein Forum in Berlin, Eichmann in Jerusalem is 
above all a contribution to the problem of evil. 
Susan Neiman:
"Although I think Hannah Arendt was one of the great readers of Kant, in one very 
crucial way she broke with one of Kant's deepest assumptions about morality – namely 
that intention is the heart of morality. And this is one of the deepest assumptions that I 
think we all have so much so that we think that if people aren't accused of having evil 
 10 
Jonathan Rée | Journey in Thought – Hannah Arendt | http://www.hannaharendt.net 
intentions, they can't be accused of actually having done evil. And this is at the heart of 
the claim of the book. Eichmann had no evil intentions; nevertheless what he did was evil.  
It’s a simple enough point, you would think – and yet people continue to be outraged by 
it. But it is a very deep point because it goes against the heart of not just the most of 
modern moral philosophy, but a great deal of legal assumptions as well." 
Arendt’s view about Eichmann was certainly contemptuous, but perhaps sometimes 
deliberately misused. But she was not trying to find excuses for Eichmann. If anything, 
she was saying that he would still be guilty whatever thoughts might have been in his 
mind, that he was still utterly evil, even if he never meant to be.
If Arendt's treatment of Eichmann and evil has been widely misunderstood, then it is 
largely because of a sentence that appears towards the end of Eichmann in Jerusalem 
which immediately took on a life of its own. Arendt has just summarized the end-game of 
the trial – how on the 11th of December 1961 the judges returned a verdict of 'guilty' on all 
fifteen accounts; how a series of appeals came to an end on the 31st of May 1962, and how 
a few hours later, Eichmann marched confidently and with great dignity to the gallows. 
He was so completely himself, Arendt says, and so thoroughly cartooned in his ridiculous 
clichés that it was as if he had overlooked the rather significant fact that this was his own 
funeral and that it was indeed he who was to be hanged.
QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
"It was as though in those last minutes he was summing up the lesson that this long 
course in human wickedness had taught us – the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-
thought-defying banality of evil."
This phrase – 'the banality of evil' – was often regarded as an attempt to excuse 
Eichmann's crimes; but it seems to me that it has not only particularly to do with 
Eichmann; it expresses a quite general idea: that evil events need not to be evidence of  
evil designs; or, as Arendt put it in her reply to Scholem, that the sources of even the most 
monstrous malignity may not go very deep.
QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
"It is indeed my opinion that evil is never radical, that it is only extreme; and that it  
possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the  
whole world precisely because it spreads like a fungus on the surface. That is its 
'banality'."
We are wrong, in other words, to assume that if anything appalling happens, there must 
be some deep-rooted, demonic reason behind it. Perfectly trivial causes can be  
responsible for perfectly terrible effects.
*
According to Susan Neiman, Arendt's attitude towards evil belongs to a tradition that 
starts with the unlucky figure of Job in the Old Testament – Job, the upright, God-fearing 
man, whose life was plagued with inexplicable misfortune. 
Susan Neiman:
"The problem of evil, of course, goes back to the book of Job – Job's question not so 
much 'Why me?,' but 'How can good and righteous people suffer, and weakened, rotten 
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people triumph and flourish?' It is a question that even God couldn't answer, and Kant 
therefore said that it wasn't worth for us ever to try. Nevertheless, it is I think the 
philosophical question that has preoccupied both ordinary people and professional  
philosophers again up through Nietzsche, that is, up through the end of the nineteenth 
century. The question for Arendt was: 'Can I find my way about in the world without 
selling my soul in it?' And 'Can I love the world, at least that I have hope to go on in it?' 
was the major question of Arendt's thought."
Does that imply that an optimistic attitude towards the possibility of redemption from 
the evil in the world is one that depends on our will power rather than on the course of 
natural events?
Susan Neiman:
"It is an excellent question. Look, I want to distinguish between optimism and hope. 
Optimism is an assumption about the way the world is going and this is not only beyond 
our power. The way the world is going looks rather bad in those days. [Yet] we have an 
obligation to hope. That is, we need to keep hoping that our actions could actually make 
the world better. So yes, in a certain sense it is an act of the will, but it is a moral act of 
will and therefore not an arbitrary matter. Although I grant you that it is one of those facts 
about both philosophy and life that I still find the most mysterious and troubling." 
In other words, hopefulness is a kind of duty. We owe it to ourselves and to humanity to 
carry on hoping, even when the objective state of the world seems pretty hopeless; in fact,  
especially then.
Hope is a matter not of predicting that things will get better, but of taking a certain kind 
of loving attitude towards the world and to human existence. Despair is therefore a moral 
pother, and hope a personal virtue. When she first read Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt's 
friend, the writer Mary McCarthy, said it had given her joy. Despite all the horrors in it,  
she said, she found it morally ‘exhilarating.’ Arendt was delighted.
QUOTE Hannah Arendt:
“You were the only reader to understand what otherwise I had never admitted: namely, 
that I wrote this book in a curious state of euphoria. Ever since I did it, I feel light-hearted 
about the whole matter. Don't tell anybody! Is it not proof positive that I have no soul!?" 
But Arendt's optimism was philosophical rather than pathological. Her teacher, Martin 
Heidegger, always taught that our lives owe their significance to our mortality; that we act 
out our existences in a field where our always present boundary is our death. Arendt 
turned this notion around reminding us that birth or natality is as much a fact of life as 
death or mortality; and that every new existence is a new beginning, and that beginning is  
the supreme capacity of man.
The importance of this notion can hardly be exaggerated, according to Stephen 
Aschheim.
Stephen Aschheim:
"Heidegger who talks about 'being towards death' makes death the horizon of his 
philosophy. Hannah Arendt is the only one I know who says: what is most important 
about being in the world is not death but natality, being born and new beginning. That in 
my view is her central normative importance." 
Not everyone agrees with this assessment, Professor Avineri for instance.
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Shlomo Avineri:
"In the century of the Holocaust I think this is kitsch. I like to see the sun shining every 
morning, new babies being born – but for philosophy, it is kitsch."
Arendt found the hostility to Eichmann in Jerusalem difficult to take, and as Susan 
Neiman explains, she was shocked to find herself shunned and vilified by much of the 
Jewish community – especially in the United States.
Susan Neiman:
"She suffered enormously. She lost – as I'm sure you know – many and deep 
friendships. She was the subject of one of the most violent smear campaigns in the history 
of twentieth-century intellectual life. And it was enormously painful for her." 
*
Back in New York, Arendt's career prospered nevertheless. She had already held 
visiting professorships at Berkley and later at Princeton, and now she got a post at 
Chicago. In 1967, she was at last able to settle into a job near her home – at New York's 
New School for Social Research. But then, a great personal disaster befell her: her 
husband she had loved and shared her life with for more than thirty years, Heinrich 
Bluecher, a working-class socialist intellectual from Berlin, died in 1970, and she found 
herself terribly alone. She received a proposal of marriage from her old friend W.H. 
Auden, but she gently turned him down and tried to concentrate on philosophical work 
instead. She embarked on an ambitious three-part study of The Life of the Mind: first 
Thinking, then Willing, and then a culminating volume on what to her was the most 
important philosophical question of all: Judging.
Judging means the special skill or tact which is required where decisions are to be taken 
which cannot be made mechanically. Judging had been the constant theme of her life – 
from her decision to abandon her native Germany and the academic career […] to her  
decision to take a job as a social worker for a Zionist organization in Paris, to her many 
years as a controversial New York intellectual, and her decision at whatever cost to her 
popularity to approach political issues not as a woman or as a Jew, but simply as a 
political citizen.
Judgment had been a central concern of Aristotle and more recently of Kant, especially 
in his so-called Third Critique – the Critique of Judgment. But for Hannah Arendt, it was 
also the noblest, the most demanding skill in the most elevated sphere of human activity, 
namely politics.
Leora Bilsky:
"As strange as it might sound, she found in Kant dealing with the experience of beauty 
(how we judge a picture to be beautiful) to give guidance to what is political judgment and 
– I think in certain cases, like the Eichmann trial – also legal judgment. How do you come 
afresh to a situation and judge it without rules? And she gave a seminar on Kant's 
Critique of Judgment and tried to develop it. She wrote that the Eichmann trial was the 
trigger to this seminar and to these thoughts about judgment." 
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Just as there were no mechanical rules for deciding what was ugly or beautiful, so there 
were none for telling political right from wrong. It is in the nature of political questions 
that they call not for dogma but for judgment. 
But the book on judging was never to be written. Arendt was about to start on it when 
she died of a heart attack in her Riverside Drive apartment on the 4th of December, 1975.  
She was sixty-nine years old. Not long before that, she had received the last of many 
letters from Martin Heidegger: ‘Die Urteilskraft ist eine schwierige Sache,’ he wrote – the 
faculty of judgment is a difficult matter.
But for Arendt, the ultimate imperative always remained the same: to love the world 
and to judge it with care.
(Transcribed for HannahArendt.net by Anna Wiehl)
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